Federalism is ostensibly misplaced to mitigate climate change as a global public concern as it is prone to import the inadequate incentive structures existing at the international level into the domestic domain. Drawing from the legal structures and procedures of Swiss federalism, this article attempts to provide a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between laws designed to mitigate climate change and federalism. It seeks to demonstrate that federalism may support effective policies to mitigate climate change, provided that the architecture of domestic climate change law meets certain criteria. These include considerable federal powers, a degree of institutional flexibility, robust formal channels of influence for subnational actors on policy formulation at the federal level, ample room for regulatory experimentalism at the lower layers of federalism, and the ‘right to act’ conferred on the Federation to avoid political impasse among the constituent units.

中文翻译：

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联邦制和减缓气候变化：灵活性、实验主义和不和谐的优点

联邦制在缓解气候变化方面表面上是错误的，因为它容易将国际层面现有的不充分激励结构引入国内领域。本文借鉴瑞士联邦制的法律结构和程序，试图对旨在缓解气候变化的法律与联邦制之间的关系进行更细致的评估。它旨在证明联邦制可以支持缓解气候变化的有效政策，前提是国内气候变化法律的架构符合某些标准。其中包括相当大的联邦权力、一定程度的制度灵活性、对地方行为者在联邦一级政策制定方面的强有力的正式影响渠道，