We present a theoretical model of corruption in organizations. Our specific focus is the role of incentives that aim to encourage whistleblowing behaviour. Corruption is modelled as a social norm of behaviour using evolutionary game theory. In particular, the dynamics of whistleblowing behaviour is captured using the replicator dynamics equation with constant and quadratic monitoring costs. We formally explore the local asymptotic stability of the equilibria. Our findings indicate that the traditional recommendations of the Beckerian approach are usually too expensive and/or unstable. We argue that an efficient mechanism for controlling corruption can be achieved by maintaining efficient salaries and imposing high rewards for whistleblowers when they detect wrongdoing. In the long term, employees can only be honest, or corrupt, or corrupt and whistleblowers; honest and whistleblowing behaviour will not coexist in the long run, since one of these two strategies is always dominated by the other.

中文翻译：

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组织中举报行为的演化博弈论模型

我们提出了一个组织腐败的理论模型。我们特别关注旨在鼓励举报行为的激励措施的作用。腐败被建模为使用进化博弈论的社会行为规范。特别是，举报行为的动态是使用具有恒定和二次监控成本的复制器动力学方程来捕获的。我们正式探索了平衡的局部渐近稳定性。我们的研究结果表明，贝克尔方法的传统建议通常过于昂贵和/或不稳定。我们认为，控制腐败的有效机制可以通过维持有效的工资和在检举人发现不当行为时对其实施高额奖励来实现。从长远来看，员工只能诚实，或腐败，或腐败和举报人；从长远来看，诚实和举报行为不会并存，因为这两种策略中的一种总是被另一种支配。