We study the effect of financial incentives on whistleblowing and the consequences for whistleblowers under the cash-for-information program of the False Claims Act (FCA). Exploiting appeals-court decisions that increase financial incentives for whistleblowing, we find that greater incentives increase the number of lawsuits filed with the regulator, the regulator's investigation length, the percentage of intervened lawsuits, and the percentage of settled lawsuits. Using information from lawsuits, a professional networking site, and background checks for up to 1,168 whistleblowers, we find that whistleblowers’ long-term annual income decreases by approximately 8.6% or $6,500 but do not find evidence of social costs. In comparison, whistleblowers can expect to receive approximately $140,000 for blowing the whistle. Overall, our results suggest that the FCA cash-for-information program helps expose corporate misconduct and helps compensate whistleblowers for their income loss.

中文翻译：

---

现金换信息举报人计划：对举报人的影响和对举报人的后果

我们根据《虚假申报法》(FCA) 的以现金换取信息计划，研究了财务激励对举报的影响以及对举报者的后果。利用上诉法院决定增加举报的财务激励，我们发现更大的激励会增加向监管机构提起的诉讼数量、监管机构的调查时间、干预诉讼的百分比以及已解决的诉讼百分比。使用来自诉讼、专业网站的信息以及对多达 1,168 名举报人的背景调查，我们发现举报人的长期年收入减少了约 8.6% 或 6,500 美元，但没有找到社会成本的证据。相比之下，举报人可以通过举报获得大约 140,000 美元。总体，