There is ample evidence that attractive individuals, across diverse domains, are judged more favourably. But most research has focused on single/one-shot decisions, where decision-makers receive no feedback following their decisions, and outcomes of their judgements are inconsequential to the self. Would attractive individuals still be judged favourably in experience-based decision-making where people make iterative decisions and receive consequential feedback (money gained/lost) following each decision? To investigate this question, participants viewed headshots of four financial partners presented side-by-side and repeatedly (over 50–100 trials) selected partners that would help maximize their profits. Following every partner-selection, participants received feedback about the net monetary gains/losses the partner had conferred. Unbeknownst to participants, two partners (one attractive, one unattractive) were equally advantageous (conferred net-gains overtime) and two partners (one attractive and one unattractive) were equally disadvantageous (conferred net-losses overtime). Even though attractive and unattractive partners were equally profitable and despite receiving feedback, participants selected attractive partners more throughout the task were quicker to reselect them even when they conferred losses and judged them as more helpful. Indeed, attractive-disadvantageous partners were preferred to the same extent (or more) as unattractive-advantageous partners. Importantly, the effect of attractiveness on decision-making was fully explained by the perceived trustworthiness of the financial partners.

中文翻译：

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一张脸值多少钱？面部吸引力偏差基于经验的货币决策

有充分的证据表明，跨不同领域的有吸引力的个人更容易被评判。但大多数研究都集中在单次/一次性决策上，决策者在做出决定后不会收到任何反馈，而且他们的判断结果对自己来说无关紧要。在基于经验的决策中，人们是否会在基于经验的决策中获得优待，在这种决策中，人们会做出迭代决策并在每个决策后收到相应的反馈（赚钱/亏钱）？为了调查这个问题，参与者查看了四个财务合作伙伴的头像并排展示，并反复（超过 50-100 次试验）选择了有助于最大化利润的合作伙伴。在每次选择合作伙伴之后，参与者都会收到有关合作伙伴赋予的净货币收益/损失的反馈。参与者不知道，两个合作伙伴（一个有吸引力的，一个不吸引人的）同样有利（赋予加班净收益），两个合作伙伴（一个有吸引力和一个不吸引人的）同样不利（赋予加班净亏损）。尽管有吸引力和没有吸引力的合作伙伴同样有利可图，并且尽管收到了反馈，但参与者在整个任务中选择更多有吸引力的合作伙伴会更快地重新选择他们，即使他们承认损失并认为他们更有帮助。事实上，有吸​​引力的不利合作伙伴与没有吸引力的优势合作伙伴在相同程度上（或更多）受到青睐。重要的是，吸引力对决策的影响完全可以用金融合作伙伴的可信赖度来解释。一个没有吸引力的）同样有利（赋予加时净收益），两个合作伙伴（一个有吸引力和一个不吸引人）同样处于不利地位（赋予加时净亏损）。尽管有吸引力和没有吸引力的合作伙伴同样有利可图，并且尽管收到了反馈，但参与者在整个任务中选择更多有吸引力的合作伙伴会更快地重新选择他们，即使他们承认损失并认为他们更有帮助。事实上，有吸​​引力的不利合作伙伴与没有吸引力的优势合作伙伴的偏好程度相同（或更多）。重要的是，吸引力对决策的影响完全可以用金融合作伙伴的可信赖度来解释。一个没有吸引力的）同样有利（赋予加时净收益），两个合作伙伴（一个有吸引力和一个不吸引人）同样处于不利地位（赋予加时净亏损）。尽管有吸引力和没有吸引力的合作伙伴同样有利可图，并且尽管收到了反馈，但参与者在整个任务中选择更多有吸引力的合作伙伴会更快地重新选择他们，即使他们承认损失并认为他们更有帮助。事实上，有吸​​引力的不利合作伙伴与没有吸引力的优势合作伙伴的偏好程度相同（或更多）。重要的是，吸引力对决策的影响完全可以用金融合作伙伴的可信赖度来解释。