ABSTRACT

A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbialism is true. Kriegel (2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x., 2008. “The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 141: 79–95. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7., 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. New York: Oxford UP) argues that the determinable-determinate relation can be pressed into service by adverbialists to respond to this problem. Grzankowski (2018. “The determinable-determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.” Analysis 78: 45–52. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx068) argues that this doesn’t work because when applied to intentional properties absurd results follow and thus the victory is pyrrhic. In this paper, I examine how we must understand the inferences at the heart of the many-property problem if we are to avoid attributing unwanted assumptions to adverbialists. With this understanding in place, there is a reply to Grzankowski on behalf of the adverbialist that holds that the determinable-determinate relation can be used as one tool among others for assessing the thought content of others. So, Grzankowski’s objection to Kriegel can be met. In the end, however, this entire dialectic is a dead end because it treats the ascriptions of intentional states as fused adverbs forming compound adverbial modifiers, and these fused adverbs lack compositionality and are syntactically simple. As such, interpreters cannot decompose the linguistic content of adverbialist ascriptions, which is nearly always a necessary step in assessing the thought content of others. So, the determinable-determinate reply actually fails because we do need these ascriptions to be subject to compositionality. In the end, adverbialists must opt for a structural approach to the many-property problem, as recently seen in the work of Banick (2021. “How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.” Synthese 198: 661–686. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-02053-0) and D'Ambrosio (2021. “The many-property problem is your problem, too.” Philosophical Studies 178: 811–832. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01459-2).

摘要

关于意向性的副词的一个严重问题是多属性问题，其中一个主要方面是声称如果副词为真，思想内容之间的自然推理就会被阻止。Kriegel (2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x., 2008. “The Dispensical Objectsability of Philosophical Objectsability” 141: 79–95. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7., 2011. The Sources of Intentionality . New York: Oxford UP) 争辩说，可确定-确定关系可以被副词使用以对此作出回应问题。Grzankowski (2018. “确定-确定关系不能拯救副词。”分析78：45-52。doi: 10.1093/analys/anx068) 认为这是行不通的，因为当应用于有意的属性时，会出现荒谬的结果，因此胜利是无效的。在本文中，我研究了如果我们要避免将不需要的假设归因于副词，我们必须如何理解处于多属性问题核心的推论。有了这种理解，代表状语者对 Grzankowski 的答复认为，可确定-确定关系可以用作评估他人思想内容的工具之一。因此，可以满足 Grzankowski 对 Kriegel 的反对。然而，最终，这整个辩证法是一个死胡同，因为它将有意状态的归属视为融合副词，形成复合状语修饰符，这些融合副词缺乏组合性，句法简单。因此，口译员无法分解副词归属的语言内容，这几乎总是评估他人思想内容的必要步骤。因此，可确定的回复实际上是失败的，因为我们确实需要这些归因服从组合性。最后，状语者必须选择结构性方法来解决多属性问题，正如最近在 Banick 的工作中所见（2021。“如何成为关于现象意向性的副词者。”）可确定的答复实际上是失败的，因为我们确实需要这些归因服从组合性。最后，状语者必须选择结构性方法来解决多属性问题，正如最近在 Banick 的工作中所见（2021。“如何成为关于现象意向性的副词者。”）可确定的答复实际上是失败的，因为我们确实需要这些归因服从组合性。最后，状语者必须选择结构性方法来解决多属性问题，正如最近在 Banick 的工作中所见（2021。“如何成为关于现象意向性的副词者。”）综合这些198：661-686。doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-02053-0) 和 D'Ambrosio (2021.“多产权问题也是你的问题。”哲学研究178: 811–832. doi:10.1007/s110908-020-020) 2）。