In this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.

中文翻译：

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制药行业专利挑战的最佳激励措施

在本文中，我们表明，反托拉斯法中的一项规定允许在比仿制药诉讼预计的日期晚的仿制药进入市场的情况下进行专利和解，可以增加消费者的福利。我们引入了一个政策参数来确定共谋的最佳附加期限，这将激励弱专利的挑战并最大程度地提高消费者福利。虽然原则上以后进入市场会带来更高的利润和更低的消费者福利，但是如果由此挑战更多的专利，这可以得到补偿。