It is widely accepted that better-connected firms exercise more political influence. However, because both social ties and political influence are difficult to observe, it remains little understood how different types of ties affect different types of political action. We develop new theory that contrasts the effects of ties to other firms in the same industry (peer ties) with ties to elected officials and bureaucrats (government ties). We argue that peer ties are useful for facilitating collective action, which is most often used to seek influence over broad policy issues that affect many firms. In contrast, while government ties are more versatile, these should primarily also allow firms to pursue narrow, particularistic issues that benefit only one or a small number of firms. Using a new survey of foreign-owned firms operating in the Philippines, we demonstrate that peer ties play an important role in firms’ efforts to influence policy at the national level, where issues are more likely to affect large numbers of firms. Government ties are also valuable, though primarily at the local level, where issues are more likely to affect a smaller number of firms.

关联度更高的公司可以发挥更大的政治影响力，这已被广泛接受。但是，由于社会纽带和政治影响力都难以观察，因此人们几乎不了解不同类型的纽带如何影响不同类型的政治行为。我们开发了新的理论，该理论将同行业中的其他公司的关系（同伴关系）与民选官员和官僚的关系（政府关系）进行了对比。我们认为同伴关系有助于促进集体行动，而集体行动通常被用来寻求对影响许多公司的广泛政策问题的影响力。相比之下，尽管政府关系更为广泛，但这些关系还应主要允许公司从事狭，的，特殊的问题，仅使一个或少数几个公司受益。通过对在菲律宾运营的外资企业的新调查，我们证明了同业关系在企业影响国家政策的努力中起着重要作用，因为在国家层面，问题更可能影响到大量企业。政府关系也很有价值，尽管主要是在地方一级，那里的问题更有可能影响到少数公司。