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Strategic Risk and Lobbying: Investigating Lobbying Breadth as Risk Management
Journal of Management ( IF 13.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-08 , DOI: 10.1177/01492063211011762
Mirzokhidjon Abdurakhmonov 1 , Jason W. Ridge 2 , Aaron D. Hill 3 , Holly Loncarich 4
Affiliation  

Despite many studies investigating how lobbying expenditures enhance performance outcomes, limited attention has been given to understanding the underlying mechanisms driving firm lobbying behaviors—and, particularly, where firms target their lobbying expenditures. We argue lobbying breadth serves as a risk management strategy to both hedge against possible government intrusion and minimize disapproval of firm actions from government officials. As such, we posit firms’ strategic risk will positively relate to breadth of lobbying firms’ target. Further, if lobbying breadth serves as risk management strategy, then other aspects that affect decisions about the amount of risk protection a firm may need should also affect this relationship. We argue that CEOs’ ownership and firms’ political uncertainty may exacerbate exposure from firm risk taking to government actions, thus strengthening the insurance relationship. Similarly, we argue available slack, as a form of internal insurance against government actions, will weaken the relationship between strategic risk taking and lobbying breadth. We find support for most of our arguments in a sample of U. S. manufacturing firms. This research extends understanding of lobbying beyond the predominant focus on expenditures and securing beneficial outcomes. Exploring how lobbying breadth serves an important risk management role also offers insights into firm nonmarket strategy.



中文翻译:

战略风险和游说:研究游说广度作为风险管理

尽管有许多研究调查了游说支出如何提高绩效结果,但是对了解驱动公司游说行为的基本机制(尤其是公司针对游说支出的目标)的关注却很少。我们认为,游说广度是一种风险管理策略,既可以对冲可能的政府入侵,又可以最大程度地减少政府官员对公司行为的不满。因此,我们认为企业的战略风险将与游说企业目标的广度成正比。此外,如果游说广度用作风险管理策略,那么影响有关企业可能需要的风险保护量的决策的其他方面也应影响这种关系。我们认为,首席执行官的所有权和公司的政治不确定性可能会加剧公司承担政府行动的风险,从而加强了保险关系。同样,我们认为,可利用的闲暇作为一种抵制政府行为的内部保险,将削弱战略风险承担与游说广度之间的关系。我们在美国制造业公司的样本中为我们的大多数论点提供了支持。这项研究扩大了对游说的理解,超出了对支出和确保有利结果的关注。探索游说广度如何在重要的风险管理角色中发挥作用,还可以洞悉公司的非市场战略。将削弱战略冒险与游说广度之间的关系。我们在美国制造业公司的样本中为我们的大多数论点提供了支持。这项研究扩大了对游说的理解,超出了对支出和确保有利结果的关注。探索游说广度如何在重要的风险管理角色中发挥作用,还可以洞悉公司的非市场战略。将削弱战略冒险与游说广度之间的关系。我们在美国制造业公司的样本中为我们的大多数论点提供了支持。这项研究扩大了对游说的理解,超出了对支出和确保有利结果的关注。探索游说广度如何在重要的风险管理角色中发挥作用,还可以洞悉公司的非市场战略。

更新日期:2021-05-08
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