The current research tests how comparisons in the moral domain differ from other social comparisons in three ways. First, an initial experience-sampling study shows that people compare downward more strongly in the moral domain than in most other domains (Study 1, N = 454), because people like to feel moral and present themselves as moral. Second, the classic threat principle of social comparison holds that people choose downward comparisons to improve their well-being after a threat to their self-esteem. We propose that in the moral domain the threat principle is intensified because morality is a uniquely important and central comparison domain. Across seven experiments (Experiments 2a and 2b, 3a-3c, 4a and 4b), we find that people search for downward comparisons much more than in other domains. This effect is so strong that people are willing to forgo money and incur time costs to avoid upward moral comparisons when threatened. Third, another classic principle of social comparison holds that people only consider comparisons that are diagnostic (i.e., close or similar) and therefore self-relevant, while dismissing extreme or dissimilar comparisons as irrelevant. We propose that this diagnosticity principle is attenuated because morality is a binding code that applies equally to all humans. Across four experiments (Experiments 5a and 5b, 6a and 6b), we find that even the most extreme and dissimilar moral (but not other) comparisons are deemed relevant and potentially threatening. Together, these twelve studies (total N = 5,543) demonstrate how moral comparisons are a ubiquitous but fundamentally distinct form of social comparison with altered basic principles. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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更具威胁性和诊断性：道德比较与社会比较有何不同。

目前的研究测试了道德领域的比较在三个方面与其他社会比较有何不同。首先，一项初步的经验抽样研究表明，人们在道德领域比在大多数其他领域（研究 1，N = 454）中的向下比较更强烈，因为人们喜欢感觉有道德并将自己表现得有道德。其次，社会比较的经典威胁原则认为，人们在自尊受到威胁后，会选择向下比较来改善自己的幸福感。我们建议在道德领域加强威胁原则，因为道德是一个独特的重要和中心比较领域。在七个实验（实验 2a 和 2b、3a-3c、4a 和 4b）中，我们发现人们比其他领域更多地搜索向下比较。这种影响如此强烈，以至于人们愿意放弃金钱并承担时间成本，以避免在受到威胁时进行向上的道德比较。第三，社会比较的另一个经典原则认为，人们只考虑具有诊断性（即接近或相似）并因此与自身相关的比较，而将极端或不同的比较视为无关紧要而不予理会。我们建议削弱这种诊断性原则，因为道德是一种同样适用于所有人的具有约束力的准则。在四个实验（实验 5a 和 5b、6a 和 6b）中，我们发现即使是最极端和最不同的道德（但不是其他）比较也被认为是相关的并且可能具有威胁性。这十二项研究（总共 N = 5，543）证明道德比较是一种普遍存在但从根本上不同的社会比较形式，其基本原则已经改变。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2021 APA，保留所有权利）。