According to probability 1 infallibilism (henceforth, infallibilism), if one knows that p, then the probability of p given one's evidence is 1. Jessica Brown (2013, Analysis, 73, 626–635; Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, 2018) has recently argued that infallibilism leads to scepticism unless the infallibilist also endorses the claim that if one knows that p, then p is part of one's evidence for p. By doing that, however, the infalliblist has to explain why it is infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. And yet, the infallibilist does not seem to have a satisfying explanation available. Call this the infelicity challenge for probability 1 infallibilism. By exploiting the distinction between the justifying and the motivating role of evidence, in this paper I argue that contrary to first appearances, the infelicity challenge does not arise for probability 1 infallibilism. However, after anticipating and resisting two objections to my argument, I show that we can identify a different version of infallibilism which seems to face a problem that is even more serious than the infelicity challenge.

中文翻译：

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绝对不会犯错

根据概率 1 infallibilism（以下称为infallibilism），如果知道 p，则给出证据的 p 的概率为 1。 Jessica Brown (2013, Analysis, 73 , 626–635; Fallibilism : Evidence and Knowledge , 2018)最近认为，无谬论会导致怀疑论，除非无谬论者也赞同这样的说法，即如果一个人知道 p，那么 p 就是一个人对 p 的证据的一部分。然而，通过这样做，无误论者必须解释为什么引用 p 作为自己的证据是不恰当的。然而，无误论者似乎没有一个令人满意的解释。将此称为概率 1 无误论的不合理挑战. 通过利用证据的证明作用和激励作用之间的区别，在本文中，我认为与第一次出现相反，概率 1 无误论不会出现不合理挑战。然而，在预见并抵制了对我的论点的两个反对意见之后，我表明我们可以识别出一个不同版本的无误论，它似乎面临着比不合理挑战更严重的问题。