The adjustment to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone countries targeted by private bondholders. Financial assistance through the newly created Eurozone governance system was conditional on the implementation of austerity measures and the introduction of structural reforms in industrial relations (decentralization of collective bargaining and liberalization of employment protection). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of Eurozone supranational institutions. Building from the insights of actor-centred institutionalism, we illustrate the importance of coalitions among some, but not all, important actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional innovation. The structural features of Eurozone institutions curtailed member states’ ability to effectively resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies. A contested outcome, these institutional features were secured by a specific coalition of important actors – most notably, the German government and the European Central Bank – based on their overlapping interests around internal devaluation policies.

对于金融危机的调整对于以私人债券持有人为目标的欧元区国家尤其残酷。通过新建立的欧元区治理体系提供的财政援助以紧缩措施的实施和劳资关系的结构改革（集体谈判的权力下放和就业保护的自由化）为条件。我们的分析集中于欧元区超国家机构的形成过程和结构特征。基于以行为者为中心的制度主义的见解，我们说明了在一些但不是全部重要参与者之间建立联盟的重要性，这些参与者基于体制创新过程中非独占性偏好的重叠。欧元区机构的结构特征削弱了成员国有效抵制内部贬值政策实施的能力。这些具有争议性的结果是，这些机构的特征得到了重要行动者（最著名的是德国政府和欧洲央行）的特定联盟的支持，这些联盟基于他们围绕内部贬值政策的利益重叠。