In the standard beauty contest game of Morris and Shin (2002), agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental value and with the conventional value expected to be set by the market. In doing so, agents respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either motive being set exogenously. Our contribution is to consider whether agents favor the fundamental or the coordination motive as the result of a strategic choice. First, we extend the generic beauty contest game by endogenizing the weight put on the coordination motive and show that the mere presence of public information theoretically leads agents to fully favor the coordination motive. The prevalence of the coordination motive over the fundamental one yields a disconnection of average actions from the fundamental. Second, we test this game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when private information is very precise in comparison to public information, qualifying the focal role of public information.

在Morris和Shin（2002）的标准选美比赛中，代理商必须根据预期的基本价值和市场设定的常规价值来选择行动。在这种情况下，行动者分别对基本动机和协调动机做出反应，这两种动机的普遍性是外生的。我们的贡献是考虑代理人是战略选择的结果是偏爱基本动机还是协调动机。首先，我们通过内化协调动机的权重来扩展通用选美比赛，并证明从理论上讲，仅公开信息的存在会导致代理商完全赞成协调动机。协调动机比基本动机普遍存在，导致平均行动与基本动机脱节。第二，我们通过实验室实验测试了这款游戏。主题倾向于符合理论预测，除非私人信息与公共信息相比非常精确，从而限定了公共信息的核心作用。