Abstract

According to phenomenal transparency, phenomenal concepts are transparent where a transparent concept is one that reveals the nature of that to which it refers. What is the connection between phenomenal transparency and our concept of a subject of experience? This paper focuses on a recent argument, due to Philip Goff, for thinking that phenomenal transparency entails transparency about subjecthood. The argument is premissed on the idea that subjecthood is related to specific phenomenal properties as a determinable of more specific determinates. I argue that the argument fails, which opens the door for one to endorse phenomenal transparency while denying transparency about the concept of a subject of experience. I draw out the consequences of this for certain versions of the combination problem for panpsychist metaphysics and moreover argue that rejecting the transparency of subjecthood does not undermine anti-physicalist arguments premissed on considerations relating to phenomenal transparency .

中文翻译：

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现象透明度和主体性的透明度

摘要

根据现象透明性，现象概念是透明的，其中透明概念是一个揭示其所指概念的性质的概念。惊人的透明度与我们的经验主题之间有什么联系？本文关注的是菲利普·高夫（Philip Goff）最近提出的一个论点，他认为惊人的透明性意味着主体性的透明性。关于主观性与特定的现象特性有关的想法是不成立的，因为主体性是可以确定的更具体的决定因素。我认为该论点失败了，这为人们认可惊人的透明度打开了大门，同时又否认了关于经验主体概念的透明度。