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Divine hiddenness or de jure objections to theism: You cannot have both
Analysis ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-05 , DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa043
Perry Hendricks 1
Affiliation  

Abstract
De facto objections to theism purport to show that theism is false, whereas de jure objections to theism claim that, whether or not theism is true, belief in God is irrational. Divine hiddenness – the (supposed) fact that there are people who non-resistantly lack belief in God – is sometimes used as an argument against theism. In this article I will show that accepting the argument from divine hiddenness carries a high cost: it eliminates all de jure objections to theism. So atheists can either have de jure objections to theism or the objection from divine hiddenness, but they cannot have both.


中文翻译:

神圣的隐匿性或法律上对有神论的异议:你们不能同时拥有

摘要
事实上对有神论的反对旨在表明有神论是错误的,而法律上对有神论的反对则声称,无论有神论是否是真实的,对上帝的信仰都是不合理的。神圣的隐性(某些人非抗拒地缺乏对上帝的信仰这一事实(有时是事实)有时被用作反对有神论的论据。在本文中,我将证明接受来自神的隐藏的论点会带来很高的代价:它消除了所有对有神论的法律反对。因此,无神论者可以在法律上对有神论提出异议,也可以对神圣的隐藏提出异议,但他们不能两者兼而有之。
更新日期:2021-05-07
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