ABSTRACT

Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano's repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects of intentionality which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation.

摘要

弗朗茨·布伦塔诺因强调意向性的重要性而闻名，但奇怪的是，他对意向性的本质却很少提及。根据马克·特克斯特的说法，这有一个深刻的原因：布伦塔诺将意向性视为一种概念原语，其本质只有在直接掌握中才能揭示。尽管这种解释肯定有文本支持，但它似乎与布伦塔诺反复尝试从“概念成分”（意向性的各个方面在现实中无法分离但可以在概念上区分）来分析意向性产生了冲突。在提出这种紧张关系后，我探索了一些解决它的选择，最终提供了我自己喜欢的解释。