ABSTRACT

For Brentano, an act of consciousness features a presentation of an object joined with an inner presentation – an ‘inner consciousness’ or inner awareness – of that object-presentation. On Mark Textor’s articulation of Brentano’s model, the act has the structure of a single experience directed upon a plurality, viz.: the object and the experience itself. I consider an alternative development of this Brentanian model. Drawing on Husserl’s part-whole ontology, I submit, the act itself has the structure of a whole formed from two co-dependent parts, viz., the object-presentation and inner awareness of that presentation. Looking to Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness, Textor proposes an enhancement of Brentano’s model of inner consciousness. On Textor’s model, inner awareness is such that one may be aware of one’s experience, in the stream of one’s consciousness, ‘without grasping any adumbrations [of the experience], but temporal ones’. I dig into Husserl’s doctrine of ‘abumbration’ (as where a tree is given visually with adumbrations of its shape on the back side, of its color in gradations, etc.). On my reconstruction, inner awareness of an experience presents the experience within a manifold of ‘adumbrated’ temporal retentions and protentions that place the experience in its stream of consciousness.

摘要

对于布伦塔诺来说，意识行为的特征是物体的呈现与该物体呈现的内部呈现——“内在意识”或内在意识——相结合。根据马克·特克斯特对布伦塔诺模型的阐述，该行为具有针对多个对象的单一体验的结构，即：对象和体验本身。我考虑对这个布伦塔尼亚模型进行替代发展。借鉴胡塞尔的部分-整体本体论，我认为，行为本身具有由两个相互依赖的部分形成的整体结构，即对象呈现和该呈现的内在意识。参考胡塞尔对内在时间意识的分析，特克斯特提出了布伦塔诺内在意识模型的增强。根据特克斯特的模型，内在意识是这样的，即一个人可以在一个人的意识流中意识到自己的经历，“不掌握任何[经验的]暗示，而是暂时的暗示” 。我深入研究胡塞尔的“隐喻”学说（一棵树在视觉上被赋予其背面形状的隐喻，其颜色的渐变等）。在我的重建中，对体验的内在意识将体验呈现在多种“预示”的时间范围内。将经验置于意识流中的保留和保留。