The connection between understanding and explanation has recently been of interest to philosophers. Inglis and Mejía-Ramos (Synthese, 2019. https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1007/s11229-019-02234-5) propose that within mathematics, we should accept a functional account of explanation that characterizes explanations as those things that produce understanding. In this paper, I start with the assumption that this view of mathematical explanation is correct and consider what we can consequently learn about mathematical explanation. I argue that this view of explanation suggests that we should shift the question of explanation away from why-questions and towards a “what’s going on here” question. Additionally, I argue that when we recognize the connection between understanding and explanation we naturally see how more than just proof can be explanatory. I expand this point by detailing how definitions and diagrams can be explanatory. In all, we see that when we take seriously the connection between understanding and explanation, we get a better sense of how explanation arises within mathematics.

最近，哲学家对理解和解释之间的联系产生了兴趣。Inglis和Mejía-Ramos（Synthese，2019.https：//doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1007/s11229-019-02234-5）提出在数学中，我们应该接受一个功能性的解释，即将解释的特征描述为产生理解的事物。在本文中，我首先假设这种数学解释的观点是正确的，然后考虑我们可以从中学到的关于数学解释的知识。我认为，这种解释观点表明，我们应该将解释问题从为什么问题转移到“这里发生了什么”问题。此外，我认为，当我们认识到理解和解释之间的联系时，我们自然就会看到，不仅仅是证明可以解释。我将通过详细介绍定义和图表的解释性来扩展这一点。总而言之，我们看到，当我们认真理解理解和解释之间的联系时，我们会更好地理解数学中解释是如何产生的。