This paper studies rational choice behavior of a player in sequential games of perfect and complete information without an assumption that the other players who join the same games are rational. The model of individually rational choice is defined through a decomposition of the behavioral norm assumed in the subgame perfect equilibria, and we propose a set of axioms on collective choice behavior that characterize the individual rationality obtained as such. As the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is a special case where all players involved in the choice environment are each individually rational, the paper offers testable characterizations of both individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games.

本文研究了一个参与者在完美和完全信息的连续博弈中的理性选择行为，而不假设加入相同博弈的其他参与者是理性的。个人理性选择模型是通过对子博弈完美均衡中假设的行为规范的分解来定义的，我们提出了一组关于集体选择行为的公理，这些公理表征了由此获得的个人理性。由于子博弈完美均衡路径的选择是一种特殊情况，其中所有参与选择环境的参与者都是个体理性的，因此本文提供了序列博弈中个体理性和集体理性的可测试特征。