We study targeted redistribution by appointed state cabinet members (ministers) in Germany. Matching data on state ministers’ place of residence and state government employment data for the universe of western German municipalities for 1994–2013, we show within a difference-in-differences framework that municipalities that are the residence of a minister experience a higher annual growth rate in state government employment if they retain this status for more than one legislative term. Thus, our results suggest that appointed cabinet members engage in hometown favoritism. We discuss several potential mechanisms for this behavior.

中文翻译：

---

任命的公职人员和地方偏itis：德国各州的证据

我们研究了德国指定的州内阁成员（部长）的有针对性的再分配。通过对1994-2013年德国西部直辖市的州长官居住地数据和州政府就业数据进行匹配，我们可以发现，在不同的框架内，作为部长居住地的直辖市的年增长率更高如果他们在一个以上的立法任期中保持这种身份，就可以享受州政府的就业率。因此，我们的结果表明任命的内阁成员参与了家乡偏favor。我们讨论了这种行为的几种潜在机制。