Corporatization has potentials for public service provision but also induces far-reaching governance challenges. Appointing executives for public corporations is a powerful personnel governance mechanism for public authorities to manage public service provision and resource dependencies. However, the theoretical understanding of executive turnover is limited. Drawing on resource dependence theory and embedding publicness fit perspectives, Cox regressions for 491 executives of 275 German municipal corporations between 2006 and 2016 show that politicized executives, executives with higher pay, and internally hired executives have a longer tenure and a lower turnover likelihood. Furthermore, the findings reveal different governance rationalities between different corporation forms by showing a higher likelihood of executive turnover in not profit-making corporations than in profit-making corporations. This highlights the theoretical needs and potentials to conceptually differentiate between these two corporation forms in future research. Overall, this study enhances the theoretical understanding of executive turnover and provides important research perspectives.

中文翻译：

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公司化公共服务的人事治理：高管资源和公司形式对营业额的影响

公司化具有提供公共服务的潜力，但也引发了深远的治理挑战。为公共公司任命高管是公共当局管理公共服务提供和资源依赖的强大人事治理机制。然而，对高管更替的理论理解是有限的。2006 年至 2016 年间，对 275 家德国市政公司的 491 名高管进行的 Cox 回归利用资源依赖理论和嵌入公共契合的观点，表明政治化的高管、薪酬较高的高管和内部聘用的高管任期更长，离职可能性更低。此外，研究结果显示，非盈利性公司的高管更替可能性高于盈利性公司，从而揭示了不同公司形式之间不同的治理合理性。这突出了在未来研究中从概念上区分这两种公司形式的理论需求和潜力。总体而言，本研究增强了对高管离职的理论理解，并提供了重要的研究视角。