How do extremist sympathizers respond to counter-radicalization efforts? Over the past decade, programs to counter violent extremism have mushroomed around the world, but little is known of their effectiveness. This study uses social media data to examine how counter-radicalization efforts shape engagement with extremist groups in the online world. Matching geolocated Twitter data on Islamic State sympathizers with granular information on counter-extremism activities in the United States, I find that, rather than deradicalizing, these efforts led Islamic State sympathizers to act strategically to avoid detection. After counter-extremism activities, the group's supporters on Twitter who were in the vicinity of these events began self-censoring expressions of support for the Islamic State, altered profile images and screen names, and encouraged followers to migrate to Telegram, an encrypted network not viewable by the public. These findings reveal previously unknown patterns in the effects of counter-extremism programs in the digital era.

中文翻译：

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打击暴力极端主义和激进言论

极端主义同情者如何应对反激进化努力？在过去十年中，打击暴力极端主义的计划在世界各地如雨后春笋般涌现，但人们对其有效性知之甚少。本研究使用社交媒体数据来研究反激进化努力如何影响网络世界中极端主义团体的参与。将伊斯兰国支持者的地理定位推特数据与美国反极端主义活动的详细信息相匹配，我发现这些努力并没有去激进化，而是导致伊斯兰国支持者采取战略行动避免被发现。在反极端主义活动之后，在这些事件附近的该组织在 Twitter 上的支持者开始自我审查支持伊斯兰国的表达，更改个人资料图像和网名，并鼓励追随者迁移到 Telegram，这是一个公众无法查看的加密网络。这些发现揭示了数字时代反极端主义计划影响的未知模式。