Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus on either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. We find that the Cournot firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas the Bertrand firm rewards sales. Both firms share contract information if the firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, if product differentiation is low, then either the Cournot firm or the Bertrand firm keeps the contract information private. Mandating information sharing can lead to an increase in consumer and social welfare but harms firms' profits.

中文翻译：

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古诺-伯特兰双头垄断中的信息共享

寡头垄断信息共享的研究集中在古诺或伯特兰市场。我们考虑古诺-伯特兰市场，在该市场中，所有者提供战略管理激励措施，并可以分享其薪酬合同的详细信息。我们发现古诺公司因销售而惩罚其经理，而伯特兰公司则奖励销售。如果公司的产品有足够的差异化，那么两家公司共享合同信息。然而，如果产品差异化程度较低，那么古诺公司或伯特兰公司都会将合同信息保密。强制信息共享可以增加消费者和社会福利，但会损害公司的利润。