Sufficient cash flow and an appropriate capital structure are foundational for the smooth operations of firms. Factoring finance provides an efficient solution for suppliers to fill capital gaps and ensure normal production. Factoring can be provided through either external or internal finance, which are both examined in this study, via factor-led factoring or retailer-led factoring. This study discusses the value of factoring finance to supply chain participants who exhibit loss aversion. Using a game-theoretic approach and equilibrium analysis, we find in each of the factoring schemes that the supplier may choose one of the three following strategies: Strategy N with no liability; Strategy P with partial liability; and Strategy F with full liability. This choice depends primarily on the financing rate and the supplier's degree of loss aversion. The choice among these strategies also affects the relationship between the retailer's order quantity and the supplier's capacity investment. We find that suppliers with low loss aversion prefer retailer-led factoring and that suppliers with high loss aversion have more incentives to adopt factor-led factoring. The loss-averse supplier is more likely to implement Strategy F under retailer-led factoring than under factor-led factoring. The loss-averse supplier tends to invest more capacity under factor-led factoring than under retailer-led finance, while the opposite is the case for the loss-neutral supplier. Our study provides guidelines for supply chain participants in their use of factoring finance to enhance their profits when accounting for both the particular factoring scheme and operational behavior.

充足的现金流和适当的资本结构是企业平稳运转的基础。保理融资为供应商提供了有效的解决方案，以填补资金缺口并确保正常生产。可以通过外部或内部财务来提供代理，在本研究中都通过因子主导的因子分解或零售商主导的因子分解对它们进行了研究。这项研究讨论了保理融资对表现出厌恶情绪的供应链参与者的价值。使用博弈论方法和均衡分析，我们发现在每个保理计划中，供应商都可以选择以下三种策略之一：不承担责任的策略N；不承担任何责任的策略N。具有部分责任的策略P；和策略F承担全部责任。这种选择主要取决于融资率和供应商的损失规避程度。这些策略中的选择也会影响零售商的订单数量与供应商的产能投资之间的关系。我们发现，低损失厌恶的供应商更喜欢零售商主导的分解，而高损失厌恶的供应商更倾向于采用因子主导的分解。规避损失的供应商更有可能实施战略F在零售商主导的保理业务下比在主导因素的保理业务下。厌恶损失的供应商倾向于在因素主导的分解下比在零售商主导的融资下投资更多的能力，而中立损失的供应商则相反。我们的研究为供应链参与者在考虑特定的保理计划和运营行为时使用保理融资以提高利润提供了指导。