Abstract

Explanations for slow global growth (secular stagnation) correctly focus on income inequality and wage formation but are incomplete. They ignore the source of wages and fail to ask why a rising profit share has not produced more investment. Older but essential insights on stagnation from Keynes, Schumpeter and Veblen complement orthodox and post-Keynesian analyses to generate a more robust explanation based on the distributional conflict over profit among firms. These thinkers highlight the importance of corporate profit strategy and organizational structure for investment behavior. A politically mediated process of strategic interaction has transformed the old Fordist dual industrial structure into a tripartite structure composed of high profit volume firms with monopolies based on intellectual property rights (IPRs), physical capital-intensive firms protected by an investment barrier to entry, and low profit volume labor-intensive firms. Profit data from Compustat and Orbis show that IPR-based firms have a lower marginal propensity to invest. Other firms with smaller profit volumes forego investment from fear of creating excess capacity in a slow growth environment. High profit firms also tend to pay higher wages, creating income inequality. Changes in antitrust, employment and intellectual property law can remedy this situation.

摘要

对全球增长缓慢（长期停滞）的解释正确地侧重于收入不平等和工资形成，但并不完整。他们忽略了工资的来源，也没有问为什么利润份额的增加没有产生更多的投资。凯恩斯、熊彼特和凡勃伦关于停滞的较早但基本的见解补充了正统和后凯恩斯主义的分析，以基于公司之间利润分配冲突产生更强有力的解释。这些思想家强调了企业利润战略和组织结构对投资行为的重要性。一个以政治为中介的战略互动过程已经将旧福特式的二元产业结构转变为由高利润公司和基于知识产权 (IPR) 的垄断企业组成的三方结构，受投资进入壁垒保护的有形资本密集型企业和低利润劳动密集型企业。Compustat 和 Orbis 的利润数据表明，基于知识产权的公司的边际投资倾向较低。其他利润较小的公司因担心在增长缓慢的环境中造成产能过剩而放弃投资。高利润公司也倾向于支付更高的工资，从而造成收入不平等。反垄断法、就业法和知识产权法的变化可以纠正这种情况。高利润公司也倾向于支付更高的工资，从而造成收入不平等。反垄断法、就业法和知识产权法的变化可以纠正这种情况。高利润公司也倾向于支付更高的工资，从而造成收入不平等。反垄断法、就业法和知识产权法的变化可以纠正这种情况。