ABSTRACT

Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons.

摘要

心灵的双重过程理论强调推理是直觉思维和反思思维之间的相互作用。本文旨在了解这两种类型的加工在道德领域如何相互作用。根据道德推理的“默认干预主义”模型，直觉和反思是相互矛盾的认知：直觉思维会引发启发式和道义反应，而反思则有利于功利主义判断。然而，默认干预主义观点的证据尚无定论，并且受到近年来越来越多的反证的挑战。最近的实证研究结果倾向于对道德领域中两种类型的信息处理采取相互依赖而不是相互冲突的观点。在这种观点中，我称之为双过程反射均衡，直觉和反思在道德推理中合作以达到一个反思的目标，这被认为是规范的辩护。总之，一方面，道德直觉的范围扩展到选择相关信息并在问题出现冲突时要求反思；另一方面，道德反思的目的是使反思前的直觉合理化，以提供清晰易懂的理由。