By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. By demonstrating that the public does not necessarily endorse central tenets of the “mental” view of pain (subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility), experimental philosophers have argued that the public holds a more “body-centric” view than most clinicians and scholars. Such a discrepancy would have important implications for how the public interacts with pain science and clinical care. In response, we tested the hypothesis that the public is capable of a more “mind-centric” view of pain. Using a series of vignettes, we demonstrate that in situations which highlight mental aspects of pain the public can, and does, recognize pain as a mental phenomenon. We also demonstrate that the public view is subject to context effects, by showing that the public’s view is modified when situations emphasizing mental and somatic aspects of pain are presented together.

根据定义，疼痛是一种在身体特定部位感受到的感官和情感体验。经历疼痛部位的躯体事件与产生疼痛心理体验的中央处理之间的确切关系仍然是争论的主题，但学术界几乎没有分歧，认为疼痛的两个方面对其体验都至关重要。然而，最近的实验工作表明了一种与这种概念化不一致的公众观点。通过证明公众不一定认可疼痛的“心理”观点（主观性、隐私和不可纠正性）的核心原则，实验哲学家认为，与大多数临床医生和学者相比，公众持有更“以身体为中心”的观点。这种差异将对公众如何与疼痛科学和临床护理互动产生重要影响。作为回应，我们检验了这样一个假设，即公众能够以更“以思想为中心”的方式看待疼痛。通过一系列的小插曲，我们证明了在强调疼痛的心理方面的情况下，公众能够并且确实将疼痛识别为一种心理现象。我们还证明公众观点受背景影响，表明当强调疼痛的精神和躯体方面的情况同时出现时，公众的观点会发生变化。并且确实将疼痛视为一种心理现象。我们还证明公众观点受背景影响，表明当强调疼痛的精神和躯体方面的情况同时出现时，公众的观点会发生变化。并且确实将疼痛视为一种心理现象。我们还证明公众观点受背景影响，表明当强调疼痛的精神和躯体方面的情况同时出现时，公众的观点会发生变化。