ABSTRACT

Which functions do social media fill for non-state armed groups in countries with internal armed conflict? Building on conflict data, interviews and media monitoring, we have reviewed the use of social media by Myanmar’s nine most powerful armed groups. The first finding is that they act like states, using social media primarily to communicate with their constituents. Second, they also use social media as a tool of armed struggle, for command and control, intelligence, denunciation of traitors, and attacks against adversaries. Third, social media serves for national and international outreach. Like Myanmar’s national army, the armed groups have combined prudent official pages with an underworld of more reckless profiles and closed groups that often breach Facebook’s official community standards. In February 2019, when Facebook excluded four groups from its platform, they lost much of their ability to reach out and act like states. Yet they kept a capacity to communicate with their constituents through closed groups, individual profiles and sophisticated use of links and shares. Finally, the article affirms that the Facebook company, in the years 2018–2020,took upon itself a role as an arbiter within Myanmar’s internal conflicts, deciding what information was allowed and disallowed.

摘要

在发生内部武装冲突的国家，社交媒体为非国家武装团体提供了哪些功能？基于冲突数据、采访和媒体监测，我们审查了缅甸九个最强大的武装团体使用社交媒体的情况。第一个发现是，它们的行为类似于国家，主要使用社交媒体与选民交流。其次，他们还将社交媒体用作武装斗争的工具，用于指挥和控制、情报、谴责叛徒和攻击对手。第三，社交媒体服务于国家和国际宣传。与缅甸的国民军一样，武装团体将谨慎的官方页面与更鲁莽的个人资料和封闭团体的黑社会结合在一起，这些团体经常违反 Facebook 的官方社区标准。2019 年 2 月，当 Facebook 将四个群体排除在其平台之外时，他们就失去了伸出援手和像国家一样行事的能力。然而，他们仍然能够通过封闭的团体、个人资料以及对链接和共享的复杂使用与他们的选民进行交流。最后，文章确认 Facebook 公司在 2018 年至 2020 年期间，在缅甸内部冲突中扮演仲裁者的角色，决定允许和禁止哪些信息。