Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles—relative to participants who recalled events in which other people violated the principles. This shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people’s willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but not the transgressions of others. These results have important implications for understanding the roles memory and personal identity in moral judgment. People’s commitment to moral principles may be maintained when they recall others’ past violations, but their commitment may wane when they recall their own violations.

规范的伦理理论和宗教传统为人们提供了普遍的道德原则。这些道德原则通常是固定的和僵化的，为道德判断和决策提供可靠的指导。在两项预先注册的研究中，我们发现一致的证据表明，与一般道德原则的一致性取决于最近在记忆中访问的事件。在回忆起他们个人违反道德原则的行为后，参与者不太同意这些原则——相对于回忆起其他人违反这些原则的事件的参与者而言。这种共识的转变在一定程度上可以解释为人们愿意为自己的道德违规行为辩解，而不是他人的违规行为。这些结果对于理解道德判断中的角色记忆和个人身份具有重要意义。当人们回忆起他人过去的违法行为时，他们对道德原则的承诺可能会保持不变，但当他们回忆起自己的违法行为时，他们的承诺可能会减弱。