Consumers’ strategic behavior and psychological perception have impact on supply chains. In this paper, we consider a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer to study the influence of disappointment-aversion strategic (DAS) consumers on supply chain members’ decisions and performance. The results of this study show that strategic consumers can reduce the profit levels of such a supply chain, whilst DAS consumers can alleviate this effect. We also study the effectiveness of a quantity commitment strategy for a centralized supply chain when faced with DAS consumers. Under certain conditions, the quantity commitment strategy can further reduce the loss of profit caused by strategic consumers. Then the maximum profit of the centralized supply chain under the quantity commitment strategy is used as a benchmark. We then analyze the coordination efficiency and implementability of a wholesale price contract and a price subsidy contract respectively in a decentralized supply chain. The results show that the wholesale price contract can achieve the optimal profit benchmark of the centralized supply chain, but it can only realize fixed profit allocation to supply chain members; the price subsidy contract can not only achieve the optimal profit of the centralized supply chain but also make arbitrary profit allocation among chain members.

消费者的战略行为和心理认知会影响供应链。在本文中，我们考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链，以研究失望厌恶策略（DAS）消费者对供应链成员的决策和绩效的影响。这项研究的结果表明，战略性消费者可以降低这种供应链的利润水平，而DAS消费者可以减轻这种影响。我们还研究了面对DAS消费者时集中承诺供应链的数量承诺策略的有效性。在一定条件下，数量承诺战略可以进一步减少战略消费者造成的利润损失。然后以数量承诺策略下的集中式供应链的最大利润为基准。然后，我们分别分析了分散式供应链中批发价格合同和价格补贴合同的协调效率和可实施性。结果表明，批发价格合同可以达到集中式供应链的最优利润基准，但只能实现对供应链成员的固定利润分配。价格补贴合同不仅可以实现集中供应链的最优利润，而且可以在链成员之间任意分配利润。但是只能实现对供应链成员的固定利润分配；价格补贴合同不仅可以实现集中供应链的最优利润，而且可以在链成员之间任意分配利润。但是只能实现对供应链成员的固定利润分配；价格补贴合同不仅可以实现集中供应链的最优利润，而且可以在链成员之间任意分配利润。