This paper assesses the value of the availability of menus of different selling mechanisms to agents in an online platform in the context of scarce perishable goods. By analyzing the choice between auctions and posted prices in the context of National Football League tickets offered on eBay, it estimates a structural model in which heterogeneous, forward-looking sellers optimally choose which selling mechanism to use and its features. Counterfactual results suggest that sellers would experience an average 87.37% decrease in expected revenues if auctions were removed and just a 4.34% decrease if posted prices were. In turn, buyers would benefit from an auction-only platform since the expected number of transactions would increase and expected transaction prices would decrease. These results suggest that while sellers benefit from menus of different selling mechanisms, the same does not hold for buyers. Thus, the implications for a platform, which should take into account both sides of the market, are ambiguous.

本文评估了在易腐烂商品稀缺的情况下，在线平台上向代理商提供不同销售机制的菜单的价值。通过分析 eBay 上提供的国家橄榄球联盟门票的拍卖和公布价格之间的选择，它估计了一个结构模型，在该模型中，异构的、具有前瞻性的卖家可以最佳地选择使用哪种销售机制及其功能。反事实结果表明，如果取消拍卖，卖家的预期收入将平均减少 87.37%，而如果取消拍卖，则预期收入仅减少 4.34%。反过来，买家将从仅限拍卖的平台中受益，因为预期交易数量会增加，预期交易价格会下降。这些结果表明，虽然卖家从不同销售机制的菜单中受益，但买家的情况却并非如此。因此，对于一个应该考虑市场双方的平台来说，其含义是不明确的。