ABSTRACT

This study investigates the impact of vertical integration on movie screening decisions using data from the Korean movie industry (Korea in the text refers to the Republic of Korea, also known as South Korea). Previous studies have found that movie exhibitors (i.e. theaters) that own distributors allocated more screens when they release their affiliated movies. The novelty of this study is that it focuses on the impact of vertical integration on showtime scheduling of integrated players that own both distribution services and theaters. Controlling for seasonality, levels of competition, and expected quality of movies, the study found evidence of the dominating power of integrated players in the market that occupied more screens and put their movies in more favorable time slots. However, this power weakened after the opening week and did not appear by the fourth week. Although the integrated exhibitors are likely to screen their affiliated distributors’ movies more in the opening week, they did not block other distributors’ movies over time. Our study suggests that the integrated theaters’ screening decisions favorable to their own movies are better understood as the result of pursuing incentives rather than as the result of blocking competitors’ movies.

摘要

这项研究使用韩国电影业的数据调查了垂直整合对电影放映决策的影响（本文中的韩国指大韩民国，也称为韩国）。先前的研究发现，拥有发行人的电影放映商（即剧院）在发行附属电影时会分配更多的屏幕。这项研究的新颖之处在于，它着重于垂直整合对同时拥有发行服务和剧院的综合播放器的放映时间安排的影响。通过控制季节性，竞争水平和电影的预期质量，该研究发现了市场上集成播放器占据主导地位的证据，这些播放器占据了更多的屏幕，并将其电影放置在更有利的时间段内。然而，在开幕一周之后，这种力量减弱了，到第四周才消失。尽管综合放映商很可能会在开幕周放映更多其附属发行商的电影，但随着时间的推移，它们并没有阻止其他发行商的电影。我们的研究表明，更好地理解综合剧院对自己电影有利的放映决策，这是追求激励的结果，而不是阻止竞争对手的电影的结果。