The lately attack on the Qualcomm’s Snapdragon chip reminds us security risks related to digital arithmetic circuits. Most system designers neglect the employed computer arithmetic algorithms or their implementation details. Arithmetic circuits are therefore usually used as “black box” units that are instantiated by third-party intellectual-property core or electronic design-automation tool vendors. In this brief, we propose the first most-significant digit-first arithmetic-based hardware Trojan attack by addressing the questions of where to insert and with what . First, we demonstrate how functional camouflage is achieved. Certain arithmetic modules can be quietly replaced with functionally equivalent ones, which we term functionally camouflaged Trojans. Next, we introduce a topologically camouflaged Trojan by employing graph-centrality analysis on rare behaviours in the circuit. The proposed approach is applicable to any digital computing scenarios. Experimental results on a financial computing system demonstrate that completely inaccurate numeric results are yielded, along with an up-to 91.6% numerical error tested.

中文翻译：

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具有功能和拓扑伪装的对抗性硬件

最近对高通公司的Snapdragon芯片的攻击使我们想起了与数字算术电路有关的安全风险。大多数系统设计人员都忽略了所采用的计算机算术算法或其实现细节。因此，算术电路通常用作“黑匣子”单元，由第三方知识产权核心或电子设计自动化工具供应商实例化。在本摘要中，我们通过解决以下问题提出了第一个最重要的基于数字优先的基于算术的硬件Trojan攻击：在哪里 插入并与 什么 。首先，我们演示如何功能性伪装。某些算术模块可以用功能上等效的模块悄悄地替换，我们称其为功能上伪装的特洛伊木马。接下来，我们介绍一个拓扑地通过对电路中的稀有行为进行图集中分析来伪装特洛伊木马。所提出的方法适用于任何数字计算方案。在金融计算系统上的实验结果表明，得出的数字结果完全不准确，并且测试的数字误差高达91.6％。