We provide evidence that the profitability of corporate insiders’ trading decreases in the degree of asymmetric timely loss recognition (TLR) of their firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with TLR reducing insiders’ information advantage over outside shareholders regarding future negative news about the firm, we find that reduced insider trading profitability is mainly driven by (a) stock sales, as opposed to purchases; (b) the price change component of trading, as opposed to its volume; and (c) insiders’ nonroutine trades, as opposed to less information driven routine trades. Although CEOs/CFOs are more likely to influence TLR, the effect is more pronounced for non-CEO and non-CFO insiders, inconsistent with reverse causality. Overall, our findings suggest that TLR reduces managers’ ability to extract rents from investors via insider trading.

我们提供的证据表明，公司内部人员交易的获利能力在其公司财务报告的不对称及时损失确认（TLR）程度上有所下降。与TLR一致，减少了内部人士在未来不利因素方面相对于外部股东的信息优势有关该公司的新闻，我们发现内幕交易盈利能力下降的主要原因是（a）股票销售而非购买；（b）交易的价格变化部分，而不是交易量；（c）内部人的非常规交易，与较少信息驱动的常规交易相反。尽管CEO / CFO更有可能影响TLR，但对于非CEO和非CFO内部人士而言，这种影响更为明显，这与反向因果关系不一致。总体而言，我们的发现表明，TLR降低了经理通过内幕交易从投资者那里获取租金的能力。