ABSTRACT

What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?

摘要

自由在儒家思想中有什么地位？我们在这个问题上发现了广泛的观点：一些人否认儒家重视甚至设想自由，而另一些人则庆祝儒家自由的独特崇高形式。本文考察了建议的范围，在这些不同的观点中找到了共识，因为所有这些观点都确定了独特的儒家强调 (i) 对善的主观肯定和 (ii) 培养与善一致的欲望和意图。儒家自由观点的差异并不是由于对儒家教义的不同解释造成的。相反，他们的分歧在于肯定或否定儒家思想的这些核心方面应该被视为“自由”。这揭示了一个关于儒家自由的未讨论的基本问题：我们可以而且应该将传统的儒家道德理想——即儒家的善与圣德——视为自由的版本吗？我们这样做有什么收获？