This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.

中文翻译：

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权力转移和监管国家的兴起：不断变化的全球市场治理

本期特刊探讨了世界经济中正在进行的权力转移对全球监管制度的影响，尤其是新兴大国在全球市场从规则接受者到规则制定者的转变过程中的变化。这篇介绍性文章提出了更好地理解这些后果的分析框架，即全球经济治理的权力转移理论 (PTT-GEG)，它将传统权力转移理论的范围扩展到国际政治经济和全球监管治理中的冲突与合作。PTT-GEG 强调监管国家机构实力的变化，作为新兴经济体不断增长的市场规模为其政府在全球监管制度中提供影响力的关键渠道。无论是一个特定的崛起大国，对于特定的监管问题，将其资源投入到建立强大的监管国家是一种政治选择，需要分析推动或抑制监管能力和能力建立的国内和国际政治的相互作用。PTT-GEG 进一步强调了新兴大国的实质性、特定政策偏好与监管现状所体现的既定大国偏好的差异程度。不应该假设分歧是给定的。这两个变量的不同组合对每个监管制度产生了关于世界经济中的权力转移将如何影响全球经济治理的不同理论预期，帮助我们确定规则接受者将成为改变制度的规则制定者的条件，