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Location-Price Equilibria when Traditional Retailers Compete Against an Online Retailer
Review of Industrial Organization ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09814-1
Stefano Colombo 1 , Zemin Hou 2
Affiliation  

We consider a location-then-price game where two traditional retailers compete with a location-irrelevant online retailer. We characterize the existing equilibria, and we show that in any possible equilibrium there is direct competition between the traditional retailers. Furthermore, the traditional retailers locate at neither a maximal nor minimal distance. In equilibrium, the price of the online retailer might be higher or lower than the price of the traditional retailers, depending on the relative competitiveness of the online retailer and the traditional retailers.



中文翻译:

传统零售商与在线零售商竞争时的位置价格均衡

我们考虑一个位置-然后价格的游戏,其中两个传统零售商与一个与位置无关的在线零售商竞争。我们描述了现有的均衡,并表明在任何可能的均衡中,传统零售商之间都存在直接竞争。此外,传统零售商的定位既不是最大距离也不是最小距离。在均衡状态下,在线零售商的价格可能高于或低于传统零售商的价格,这取决于在线零售商和传统零售商的相对竞争力。

更新日期:2021-05-04
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