This paper documents the evolution of sector-level collective agreements in Italy and investigates wage differentials associated with the diffusion of non-representative agreements, often signed by unknown organizations—that is, the so-called pirate agreements. Using employer–employee data from Social Security Archives, we find that non-representative agreements are associated with significant wage penalties (up to −8 percent) compared with regular collective agreements. Wage penalties are heterogeneous across firm size and industry affiliation. It is also shown that half of the wage differential is due to selection effects. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence of firms’ coping strategies, showing that pirate agreements exhibit comparatively higher employment levels.

中文翻译：

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失去控制？工会的代表性，海盗集体协议和工资

本文记录了意大利部门级集体协议的演变，并研究了与非代表性协议（通常由未知组织签署）（即所谓的海盗协议）的传播相关的工资差异。通过使用来自社会保障档案馆的雇主-雇员数据，我们发现与常规集体协议相比，非代表性协议与重大的工资罚款（最高为8％）相关。工资罚款在企业规模和行业隶属关系上是不同的。还表明，工资差异的一半是由于选择效应造成的。最后，我们提供了企业应对策略的暗示性证据，表明海盗协议显示出相对较高的就业水平。