Driven by the EU 2019 low-carbon emission standard for automobile industry, gasoline car brands such as Fiat have considered either to (1) pay penalty or (2) cooperate with E-vehicle brands such as Tesla to “pool” their carbon emissions. These two strategies result in corresponding supply chain structures where the latter has co-operation relationship between automobile brands because the gasoline car brand has to purchase and resell E-vehicles. In this paper, we study under what conditions the gasoline car brand will choose the “Pooling Strategy”, which promotes low-carbon transformation. We show that the gasoline car brand's profit will always be hurt by the “EU 2019 Standard”, but a sufficiently high excess emission premium can successfully induce the gasoline car brand to choose the “Pooling Strategy”. We then develop a lifetime environmental performance index and find that, interestingly, a tighter carbon emissions standard may result in worse environmental performance.

在欧盟2019年针对汽车行业的低碳排放标准的推动下，菲亚特（Fiat）等汽油汽车品牌已考虑要么（1）处以罚款，要么（2）与特斯拉（Tesla）等电动汽车品牌合作以“汇总”其碳排放量。这两种策略形成了相应的供应链结构，后者在汽车品牌之间具有合作关系，因为汽油汽车品牌必须购买和转售电动汽车。在本文中，我们研究了汽油车品牌将在何种条件下选择“泳池策略”，以促进低碳转型。我们表明，汽油车品牌的利润将始终受到“ EU 2019标准”的损害，但是足够高的超额排放溢价可以成功地诱使汽油车品牌选择“汇集策略”。