For on-demand service platforms in general (including food, grocery, and fresh-product delivery platforms) and, in particular, shared-mobility service systems, customers are plausibly heterogeneous in their private delay sensitivity and preference for products. This paper develops incentive contracts with substitution or non-substitution strategies, consisting of steady-state scheduling rules, probabilistic routing policies, binary admission controls and pricing strategies, to maximize platforms’ revenue. Furthermore, we analyze the influence of information structures on the design of the incentive contract and find that if the horizontal preference is observable, the service provider should pay information rent to patient customers. However, if the delay sensitivity is observable, the first-best result continues to be optimal.

对于一般的按需服务平台（包括食品，杂货和新鲜产品交付平台），尤其是共享出行服务系统，客户在私人延迟敏感性和对产品的偏爱方面似乎是异类的。本文开发了具有替代或非替代策略的激励合同，其中包括稳态调度规则，概率路由策略，二进制准入控制和定价策略，以最大化平台的收入。此外，我们分析了信息结构对激励合同设计的影响，发现如果可以观察到横向偏好，服务提供商应向患者客户支付信息租金。但是，如果可以观察到延迟灵敏度，则最佳结果仍然是最佳的。