In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises’ choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies’ choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market, can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

中文翻译：

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如何在电力市场中促进合规管理？基于进化博弈模型的分析

本文旨在分析如何在电力市场中有效地促进合规管理。在没有政府监管的情况和有政府监管的情况这两种不同的情况下，我们构建了一个演化博弈模型，并明确描述了电力市场中电力企业和监管者的战略行为和动态演化过程。根据演化稳定策略的结果，我们发现，在没有政府监督的情况下，电力企业选择“合规”策略和监管机构选择“不贿赂”策略的长期稳定平衡是困难的。被实现。只有政府有效监督电力市场的合规管理，能否实现两个利益相关者的理想合规行为。此外，我们进行了仿真研究，以分析各种模型参数对动态演化过程的影响。具体结果表明，电力企业的履约成本越低，心理成本越高，利润损失越大，检查成本越低，心理成本越高，监管机构的奖励越多，可以促进电力企业的发展。形成合规管理。此外，政府收取的较大罚款也有利于电力市场的合规管理。心理成本越高，电力企业的利润损失越大，检查成本越低，心理成本越高，监管机构的报酬越大，可以促进履约管理的形成。此外，政府收取的较大罚款也有利于电力市场的合规管理。心理成本越高，电力企业的利润损失越大，检查成本越低，心理成本越高，监管机构的报酬越大，可以促进履约管理的形成。此外，政府收取的较大罚款也有利于电力市场的合规管理。