We experimentally test whether the gap between reference and actual income impacts subsequent altruism. Participants first perform a real-effort task for a fixed wage and then play a dictator game. Between conditions, we vary the level and the timing of the revelation of the wage. In some conditions, participants know the wage before the real effort task and are not informed of the other potential levels. In some other conditions, they are informed of the distribution of wages before the real effort task, but the actual wage is only revealed afterward. Participants in the latter conditions can form references that may be higher or lower than their actual wage. Our hypothesis is that the gap between the reference and the actual wage impacts transfers in the subsequent dictator game, either because participants want to compensate their recent losses, or because of the emotional reaction to gains and losses. The results support this hypothesis: participants who get the low wage transfer less and are less likely to transfer when they are informed of the other potential levels than when they are not. Conversely, participants who get the high wage are more likely to transfer positive amounts when they are informed of the other potential levels. We use physiological (skin conductance response) and declarative data to discuss the role of emotions in our treatment effects.

我们通过实验测试参考收入与实际收入之间的差距是否会影响随后的利他主义。参与者首先执行固定工资的实际任务，然后玩独裁者游戏。在不同的条件下，我们会改变工资披露的水平和时间。在某些情况下，参与者会在实际工作之前知道工资，而不会被告知其他潜在水平。在其他一些情况下，他们会在实际工作任务之前被告知工资的分配，但是实际工资仅在事后才被告知。后一种情况的参与者可以形成可能高于或低于其实际工资的参考。我们的假设是，参考值与实际工资之间的差距会影响随后的独裁者博弈中的转移，这可能是因为参与者希望补偿其最近的损失，还是因为对得失的情感反应。结果支持以下假设：与低收入者相比，获得低工资转移的参与者更少，并且在被告知其他潜在水平时转移的可能性也较小。相反，获得高工资的参与者在被告知其他潜在水平时更有可能转移正数。我们使用生理（皮肤电导反应）和声明性数据来讨论情绪在我们治疗效果中的作用。当被告知其他潜在水平时，获得高工资的参与者更有可能转移正数。我们使用生理（皮肤电导反应）和声明性数据来讨论情绪在我们治疗效果中的作用。当被告知其他潜在水平时，获得高工资的参与者更有可能转移正数。我们使用生理（皮肤电导反应）和声明性数据来讨论情绪在我们治疗效果中的作用。