This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.

本文利用竞争中外生变化的新来源，研究了竞争对美国航空业质量提供的影响。虽然市场老牌企业之间的合并可能会扼杀竞争，但如果合并的航空公司在市场上合并之前没有运营，但每个航空公司都在不同的航线端点存在，则合并可能会增加进入的可能性。我们发现，非合并的现有航空公司在进入威胁时会提高其飞行频率，并通过降低进入时的飞行频率来适应新合并的航空公司的进入。虽然非合并在位公司仅在新合并的航空公司入场时就减少了到达延迟，但我们发现，在合并公告和新合并的航空公司入场时，在职者会降低其注销率和离场延误。