Both philosophers and scientists have recently promoted transparency as an important element of responsible scientific practice. Philosophers have placed particular emphasis on the ways that transparency can assist with efforts to manage value judgments in science responsibly. This paper examines a potential challenge to this approach, namely, that efforts to promote transparency can themselves be value-laden. This is particularly problematic when transparency incorporates second-order value judgments that are underwritten by the same values at stake in the desire for transparency about the first-order value judgments involved in scientific research. The paper uses a case study involving research on Lyme disease to illustrate this worry, but it responds by elucidating a range of scenarios in which transparency can still play an effective role in managing value judgments responsibly.

哲学家和科学家最近都将透明度提升为负责任的科学实践的重要元素。哲学家们特别强调透明度可以帮助以负责任的方式管理科学价值判断的方式。本文探讨了这种方法的潜在挑战，即促进透明度的努力本身可能充满价值。当透明度包含二阶价值判断时，这尤其成问题，而这些二阶价值判断由相同的价值支撑，以期对科学研究中涉及的一阶价值判断的透明度的渴望。该论文使用一个涉及莱姆病研究的案例研究来说明这种担忧，