In his recent monograph, (Re-)defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (2020), Alberto G. Urquidez invites the reader to take a fresh look at the confused and complicated concept of racism. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Urquidez argues that debates over racism are not about discovering what racism really refers to in the world but the appropriate rule of representation— the standard of the correct use of the term (p. 25–26). Discovering racism is a normative endeavor and, he argues, a prescriptive one (Urquidez, p. 26). My comments here are not intended as a critique of Urquidez’ account so much as an opportunity to reflect on where he might go from here in developing his account. In particular, I focus on lingering questions over the relationship between the critique of structures and practices licensed by political morality and that of individual behaviors. I explore how Urquidez grounds claims of individual moral responsibility for racism.

Alberto G. Urquidez在他最近的专着《重新定义种族主义：哲学分析》（2020）中，邀请读者重新审视种族主义这个令人困惑和复杂的概念。根据维特根斯坦的语言哲学，乌尔基德斯认为，关于种族主义的辩论不是关于发现种族主义在世界上真正指的是什么，而是关于适当的代表规则—正确使用该术语的标准（第25–26页）。发现种族主义是一项规范性的工作，他认为这是一种规范性的工作（Urquidez，第26页）。我在这里的评论并不是要批评乌尔基德斯（Urquidez），而是提供一个机会来思考他在发展自己的帐户时可能从这里走到哪里。特别是，我专注于对政治道德许可的结构和实践的批判与个人行为的批判之间的关系挥之不去的问题。我将探讨乌尔基德斯（Urquidez）如何根据个人对种族主义的道德责任提出主张。