We explore the role of prominence in equilibrium pricing in markets where search is sequential and random. Our model key feature is that more prominent firms are more likely to be sampled first. In contrast to ordered-search models, we find that more prominent firms inherit larger but less elastic demands, and as such have incentives to post larger prices. However, they might post lower prices but still charge higher markups than less prominent competitors only if they are also sufficiently more efficient. Our results suggest that when search is sequential, the role of prominence depends on whether it modifies the order or just the chances with which firms are sampled.

我们探索在顺序搜索和随机搜索的市场中，突出在均衡定价中的作用。我们模型的关键特征是，更著名的公司更有可能首先被采样。与有序搜索模型相反，我们发现更多的知名公司继承了更大但弹性较小的需求，因此有动机发布更大的价格。但是，只有在效率也足够高的情况下，它们可能会发布较低的价格，但仍会比不那么突出的竞争对手收取更高的加价。我们的结果表明，当搜索是顺序的时，突出的作用取决于它是修改顺序还是仅对公司进行抽样的机会。