ABSTRACT

In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.

摘要

为了构建一个令人满意的理论诚一诚意（使思想真诚），朱熹朱熹发展帐户的自欺欺人（如何梓岐自欺）是可能的，一个是一直困扰着许多哲学家深刻的问题。在朱看来，志知（知道）可分为两类：先验认识和经验的认识。经验知道定义三类自我欺骗的进一步划分：（1）由一种的无知（自欺欺人武志无知），由一个人的浅表知道（（2）自我欺骗芡志浅知），以及（3）当一个人获得真正的知识时可能发生的自欺欺人（真知真知）。在本文中，我将构建遵循朱在自欺欺人的判定基准定义自欺欺人的理论模型大雪山张炬大学章句（大学习解读），从而占这三个种类的自我欺骗的可能性。此外，更好地理解朱的自欺欺人的概念可以为他的形而上学和道德心理学的进一步研究开辟富有成效的途径。