Purpose

This study aims to investigate how multiple large shareholders individually and interactively influence Middle East and North Africa (MENA) bank stability.

Design/methodology/approach

The empirical framework is based on a generalized dynamic two-step system and utilizes the method of moments estimation to analyze a panel dataset of 532 bank-year observations over the 2004–2017 period.

Findings

The estimation results show that large shareholders are crucial in explaining the differences in bank stability among MENA banks. Specifically, the first- and second-largest shareholders exacerbate bank instability. However, we found that the third-largest shareholder enhances bank stability. Additionally, the coalition between the two largest shareholders increases the moral hazard problem in MENA banks and significantly decreases stability. Meanwhile, the interaction between the three largest shareholders is associated with a control contestability problem, which impels better bank stability. The results support the dispersion effect of multiple large shareholders in MENA countries.

Originality/value

The role of large shareholders in corporate governance is widely recognized. However, very little is known about the role and the real impact that multiple large shareholders may have on the banking sector. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this work is the first to analyze the relationship between multiple large shareholders and bank stability in the MENA region.

中文翻译：

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多个大股东与银行稳定性：中东和北非银行案例

目的

本研究旨在调查多个大股东如何单独和互动地影响中东和北非 (MENA) 银行的稳定性。

设计/方法/方法

经验框架基于广义动态两步系统，并利用矩估计方法分析 2004-2017 年期间 532 个银行年观测值的面板数据集。

发现

估计结果表明，大股东是解释 MENA 银行之间银行稳定性差异的关键。具体而言，第一大和第二大股东加剧了银行的不稳定。然而，我们发现第三大股东增强了银行的稳定性。此外，两个最大股东之间的联盟增加了 MENA 银行的道德风险问题，并显着降低了稳定性。同时，三大股东之间的互动与控制权竞争问题相关联，从而促进了银行更好的稳定性。结果支持了中东和北非国家多个大股东的分散效应。

原创性/价值

大股东在公司治理中的作用得到广泛认可。然而，对于多个大股东可能对银行业产生的作用和实际影响知之甚少。据作者所知，这项工作是首次分析中东和北非地区多个大股东与银行稳定性之间的关系。