We examine whether directors utilize private information obtained through their committee memberships to depart from firms prior to the revelation of their poor performance. Such departures raise the concern that directors leave the firm when they are most needed. Utilizing private information to make decisions in their personal interest may also violate the directors’ fiduciary duties. We focus on departures of audit committee members since information regarding earnings quality should be available to them prior to public release. The departure of audit committee members who serve on multiple boards is coincident with a deterioration in earnings quality. Other directors do not appear to time their departure based on declines in earnings quality. Results from examining the reasons behind this finding are consistent with the director's preference to lead a “quiet life” and a desire to lower their exposure to litigation risk rather than to protect their reputation in the director market.

中文翻译：

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董事会委员会和董事离职

我们检查董事是否利用通过其委员会成员资格获得的私人信息在他们的表现不佳之前离开公司。这种离职引起了董事们在最需要他们时离开公司的担忧。利用私人信息为个人利益做出决定也可能违反董事的受信义务。我们关注审计委员会成员的离职，因为他们应该在公开发布之前获得有关收益质量的信息。在多个董事会任职的审计委员会成员离职与盈利质量恶化相吻合。其他董事似乎没有根据盈利质量的下降来确定他们的离职时间。检查这一发现背后的原因的结果与导演的一致