We consider the supply chain in the tourism industry, in which tourists are susceptible to the tourists' green tourism experience when they make purchase decisions for a green tourism product. Our research considers a green tourism supply chain (GTSC) consisting of one scenic spot (SS) and one travel agency (TA), and studies the joint green tourism service, pricing and advertising problem of the SS and the TA. We establish Stackelberg differential game models between the SS and the TA in the centralized, decentralized and revenue-sharing scenarios, and apply Pontryagin's maximum principle to obtain the dynamic equilibrium solutions of the GTSC members. Based on the three different scenarios, we analyze influences of the tourists' green tourism experience concern level, the wholesale ticket price and the sharing ratio on the optimal decisions and performances of the GTSC. This paper is the first quantitative research to study the green tourism service effort, pricing and advertising strategies of the GTSC members and design GTSC improvement contract with considering the green tourism experience. Our results provide management insights for the SS and the TA to manage GTSC under the green tourism preferences and the green tourism experience of tourists.

我们考虑旅游业的供应链，其中游客在做出绿色旅游产品的购买决定时容易受到绿色旅游经验的影响。我们的研究考虑了一个由一个景点（SS）和一个旅行社（TA）组成的绿色旅游供应链（GTSC），并研究了SS和TA的联合绿色旅游服务，定价和广告问题。我们在集中，分散和收益共享的情况下，在SS和TA之间建立了Stackelberg差分博弈模型，并应用Pontryagin的最大原理来获得GTSC成员的动态均衡解。基于三种不同的情况，我们分析了游客对绿色旅游体验关注程度的影响，GTSC最佳决策和绩效的批发机票价格和分担比例。本文是第一份定量研究，其研究绿色旅游业委员会成员的绿色旅游服务工作，定价和广告策略，并在考虑绿色旅游经验的基础上设计GTSC改善合同。我们的结果为SS和TA在绿色旅游偏好和游客绿色旅游经验下管理GTSC提供了管理见解。