International organizations (IOs) increasingly pool resources and expertise. Under what conditions do they pool rather than compete when their activities overlap? Drawing on elite interviews, I argue that even though many cooperation decisions are made by staff possessing high degrees of autonomy from member state principals, IOs are more likely to pool resources when their leading stakeholders are geopolitically aligned. Regardless of whether member states directly oversee the negotiation of these arrangements, staff design policies that are amenable to major stakeholders. I test this argument with regression analysis of an original data set that documents patterns of co-financing and information sharing among IOs in the development issue area. I further supplement these tests with an elite survey experiment deployed via LinkedIn to bureaucrats from various development IOs. Across the board, I find evidence consistent with my theory.

中文翻译：

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台球还是决斗？国际组织间的合作与竞争

国际组织 (IO) 越来越多地汇集资源和专业知识。当他们的活动重叠时，在什么情况下他们会合并而不是竞争？借鉴精英访谈，我认为，尽管许多合作决策是由对成员国负责人拥有高度自治权的员工做出的，但当主要利益相关者在地缘政治上保持一致时，IO 更有可能集中资源。无论成员国是否直接监督这些安排的谈判，工作人员都会设计适合主要利益相关者的政策。我通过对原始数据集的回归分析来检验这一论点，该数据集记录了发展问题领域 IO 之间的共同融资和信息共享模式。我通过 LinkedIn 部署到来自各种开发 IO 的官僚机构的精英调查实验，进一步补充了这些测试。总的来说，我发现证据与我的理论一致。